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“I Am First and Foremost a Man of Logic” – 
Stereotyping, the Syndrome Character of Prejudice, and 
a Glance at Anders Breivik’s Manifesto
Bjoern Milbradt, Institute of Social Work and Social Welfare, University of Kassel, Germany
Attitudes, stereotyping, and prejudice are often conceived of as inner, mental or cognitive processes. Drawing on discursive psychology and critical theory, this 
article proposes a language-based understanding of stereotyping and the “syndrome character” of prejudice that is able to avoid certain epistemological 
shortcomings and connect social-psychological and sociological research. Stereotyping is outlined as a relational concept that denotes a linguistic mode of 
relating to the world, whilst the syndrome character of prejudice is conceptualized as a phenomenon that shows in particular stereotypical speech acts, but 
does not completely coincide with them. The impact of this conceptual figuration is empirically illustrated using Anders Breivik’s manifesto.
Introduction
The concept of a syndrome character of prejudice has long 
been a subject of quantitative and qualitative research on 
prejudice (Adorno et al. 1950; Heitmeyer 2002; Zick, 
Hövermann, and Krause 2012). The essential core of 
approaches that use this concept is probably that if a per-
son is prejudiced against one outgroup, they are most likely 
to be prejudiced against other outgroups as well. Whilst the 
substantiality of the syndrome character of prejudice has 
been proved by long term quantitative empirical research 
(Heitmeyer 2012), less attention has been paid to the the-
oretical derivation of the concept . Theodor W. Adorno and 
colleagues noted the interconnection of different preju-
dices in their study on the Authoritarian Personality 
(Adorno et al. 1950), arguing that unconscious, deep-
rooted character traits may be responsible for this stereo-
typed devaluation of various outgroups. Thus, they 
dislocated the object of their interest to a place where it 
cannot be observed, at least not directly: the minds of their 
subjects.
In the following I will outline a relational concept of stereo-
typing. By locating the process of stereotyping in language, 
it will be possible to avoid shortcomings associated with 
approaches that conceptualize stereotyping as a primarily 
“inner” or “mental” occurrence. Because the researchers of 
the Frankfurt School themselves partly applied an episte-
mologically and methodically problematic differentiation 
between “inner” phenomena and their outward appear-
ances, I will in a first step illustrate the approach of dis-
cursive psychology to problems of social psychology (1.1.). 
Subsequently I will show that the Dialectic of Enlighten-
ment (Horkheimer and Adorno 1997) includes consider-
ations on stereotyping as a linguistic phenomenon that 
may shed new light on the notion of a syndrome character 
of prejudice as it is applied in the Authoritarian Personality 
as well as in contemporary research on prejudice (1.2).1 
Then I will illustrate the impact of this approach using the 
manifesto of Anders Behring Breivik, the Norwegian mass 
murderer (2.). In a last step, I will outline theoretical and 
methodological consequences of this approach (3.).
1 It is not my intention to present a new interpre-
tation of the Dialectic of Enlightenment or the Auth-
oritarian Personality. Rather, I would like to show 
that if one shifts the focus of the interpretation of 
those classical texts from ‘inner’ processes to lan-
guage, certain problems of the conceptualization of 
stereotypes and the syndrome character of prejudice 
vanish.
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1. The Concept of Stereotyping
1.1 Discursive Psychology and the Study of Attitudes and Stereotypes
What is the medium of stereotyping? According to Gordon 
Allport, a stereotype is “an exaggerated belief associated 
with a category” and an aspect “of a complex mental pro-
cess” (1958, 187). A stereotype may influence what we are 
able to perceive, but the stereotype itself is never directly 
observable, and we can only indirectly infer from behavior 
or language that a stereotyped mentality exists. The same 
goes for his concept of attitudes, which, according to All-
port, “are never directly observed, but, unless they are 
admitted, through inference, as real and substantial 
ingredients in human nature, it becomes impossible to 
account satisfactorily either for the consistency of any indi-
vidual’s behavior, or for the stability of any society” (1935, 
839). Stangor admits that nowadays there are “tens, if not 
hundreds of definitions in the literature, although they are 
mostly based on the general idea of stereotypes as knowl-
edge structures that serve as mental ‘pictures’ of the group 
in question” (2009, 2). Accordingly, the main problem con-
cerning the understanding of stereotypes is not so much 
whether the approach is a social psychological or sociologi-
cal one, whether it is quantitative, experimental, or quali-
tative.2 Rather, the problematic aspect that seems to 
provoke the multiplicity of definitions is the location of 
stereotypes, that is, whether they are conceived of as 
hidden inner states that are not directly observable or as a 
linguistic phenomenon. Thus, I will not give a review of 
definitions, which has been done elsewhere (Ashmore and 
Del Boca 1981, Miller 1982), but outline what could be 
meant when we speak of “stereotypes.” Given that the con-
cept originally meant a printing plate used in the pub-
lishing industry and was – as far as we know – first 
borrowed for the social sciences by Walter Lippmann 
(1949), its metaphorical character becomes immediately 
clear. Its original, non-metaphorical meaning was “a relief 
printing plate cast in a mould made from composed type 
or an original plate,”3 and in the following we will take a 
closer look at what it could reasonably mean if we switch 
the focus of research from unobservable inner processes to 
language as the medium of stereotypes.
For several years, discursive psychology led the way in 
challenging this conception of attitudes, stereotyping, and 
prejudice as ostensibly inner and nonverbal processes or 
structures that somehow attach to language, leaving lan-
guage as mere trace for those unobservable processes or 
structures. As Billig puts it: “Thus, much of social psychol-
ogy, especially cognitive social psychology, has objects of 
study – whether ‘attitude systems’, ‘social identities’ or 
‘cognitive schemata’ which are presumed to be internal 
processes and, as such, hidden from view. These objects are 
the focus of considerable social psychological investigation, 
but are ghostly essences, lying behind and supposedly con-
trolling what can be directly observed” (2001, 210). To 
avoid dealing with those “ghostly essences” and to put 
(social) psychology on a discursive/rhetorical basis, exten-
sive research has been done, for instance in the field of 
attribution and the psychology of memory (Edwards and 
Potter 1992), racism (Wetherell and Potter 1992), or 
nationalism (Billig 2006). The common ground most 
studies in discursive/rhetorical psychology share is
a) A far-reaching critique of approaches that conceptualize 
attitudes, prejudice, stereotyping, or ideology as some-
how or other “inner” states or processes. If, it is argued, 
words have no objective or intrinsic meaning, but 
acquire their meaning only in concrete social contexts, 
then such approaches miss their goal of discovering 
basic mechanisms of the human psyche. Ironically, this 
happens in the course of efforts to ensure access to 
those mechanisms, assuming that only a language 
“sanitized and shorn of context and usage” (Edwards 
and Potter 1992, 157) will bring this result.
b) Based on this, a concentration on everyday language. If, 
in and by the medium of language, the individual does 
not express a mentality or an inner psychological 
2 The authors of the Authoritarian Personality – 
albeit rather relying on Freudian psychoanalysis – 
very similarly distinguished between the “surface” of 
language and underlying personality traits and 
needs (Adorno et al. 1950, 2ff.).
3 Oxford Dictionaries, “stereotype,” 
http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/
stereotype.
IJCV : Vol. 7 (1) 2013, pp. 150 – 163
Bjoern Milbradt: Stereotyping, Prejudice, and Breivik’s Manifesto 153
dynamic, but first and foremost “discourse is actively 
constitutive of both social and psychological processes” 
(Wetherell and Potter 1992, 59), then studying everyday 
language must be the priority of psychology.
The goal of rhetoric and discursive psychology is not to deny 
that there are inner processes happening in the human mind 
or to assert that all psychological problems could be reduced 
to language problems. Rather, the focal point of attention is 
turned from language as a trace of inner processes to lan-
guage as a kind of action that first and foremost socially con-
stitutes activities like “remembering” or “hoping.” Let us 
examine what it means when we, for instance, say that “I 
hope that X will arrive today.” If someone asks us how we 
could know that we hope that X will arrive today, we will 
not somehow “turn inside” and reveal an inner process of 
“hoping,” but perhaps say something like “Well, I’m pretty 
nervous; I can’t concentrate; I’m looking out of the window 
pretty often; I’m pondering if I should buy the ingredients 
for X’s favorite dish, just in case she arrives today” and so 
on. That is to say, a discursive understanding of “hoping” 
does not deny that there may be inner processes that go 
along with “hoping” (such as being nervous, unable to con-
centrate, etc.), but it does deny that there is a distinctive 
mental process of “hoping” going on and, thus, we rather 
have to take a closer look at the various speech acts that may 
be connected to “hoping” in everyday language: “When I 
think in words, I don’t have ‘meanings’ in my mind in addi-
tion to verbal expressions; rather, language itself is the 
vehicle of thought” (Wittgenstein 2009, 113). Consequently, 
“hoping,” “remembering,” “believing,”etc. are no longer 
seen as hidden individual mental processes, but as social 
activities (Billig 2001, 213), and in the following we will 
further examine what that could imply for “stereotyping.”
Despite this view of language as a social praxis, discursive 
psychological research often leaves the interconnection 
between society and language, between social power 
relations and individual attitudes, relatively dim and frag-
mentary, concentrating on the qualitative empirical study 
of the communicative construction of attitudes or preju-
dices in interviews, newspaper articles, or focus groups. Bil-
lig (1991, 8), following Roland Barthes, suggests that this is 
not a simple power relation between the dominant and the 
dominated class, the former dominating the language and 
therefore the thoughts of the latter. Rather, he writes that 
“the speaker simultaneously is in charge of language and is 
captured by it,” and that the speaker “can be portrayed as 
both master and slave” (ibid.). He or she is at the same 
time a slave of language, because he or she has to use and 
“recycle” (Billig) a preexisting language which he or she did 
not influence, and a master because he or she is able to (at 
least partly) creatively combine and change this given lan-
guage. This implies that stereotyping and prejudice can be 
conceptualized neither as mere indoctrination by dominat-
ing classes (as in some Marxist approaches) nor as phe-
nomena that are solely due to the individual (as in some 
psychological approaches). Language, in short, mediates 
the social and the individual; it is the medium in which 
society and the individual meet. For when we speak, we 
make use of words that already exist and have been used 
over and over again; that convey a particular content which 
may have changed over time and certainly is – at least to a 
certain extent – variable, but nonetheless necessarily refers 
to a past and present social context. Therefore, language is 
essentially social and cannot be reduced to the individual – 
we cannot reasonably think of a private language (Wittgen-
stein 2009, 98ff.).4 Thus, if we do not think of stereotyping 
as an “inner” or mental process, but as a process that 
happens in the medium of language, what, then, is it?
1.2. Critical Theory and Its Concept of Stereotyping
Critical Theory, in some of its most famous studies, offered 
a theoretical approach that enables us to conceptualize lan-
guage as the medium of stereotypes and simultaneously as 
the medium where the individual and the social meet. That 
may surprise the reader, for the critical theory of the 
Frankfurt School has seldom been read as a philosophy of 
4 It is not my goal to examine the compatibilities 
and incompatibilities of discursive/rhetorical psy-
chology and critical theory. However, while critical 
theory is a theory of the totality of society, discursive 
psychology does not build on this kind of philo-
sophical and sociological thought. This may point to 
a possible fruitful combination of the two theories, 
as I will show at the end of the paper. As far as the 
philosophy of ordinary language is concerned, 
Schatzki (1996) and Winch (1990) elaborated its 
relation to sociology and social science.
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language, and in Habermas’s Theory of Communicative 
Action (1986) and the ensuing discussion it was criticized 
as an old-fashioned piece of social ontology. In the follow-
ing I will show that reading the Dialectic of Enlightenment 
as a theory that comprises a philosophy of language allows 
us a productive new insight into the Authoritarian Person-
ality and stereotyping in general.
It was especially the Dialectic of Enlightenment fragment 
“Elements of Anti-Semitism: Limits of Enlightenment” 
and in particular the notion of “ticket thinking” that 
sparked controversy concerning its impact for research on 
anti-Semitism and prejudice. The concept of ticket think-
ing, in short, denotes a way of thinking that has deterio-
rated so much in the process of enlightenment that 
stereotyped thought:
is all that remains. A choice is still made, but only between total-
ities. Anti-Semitic psychology has been replaced by mere 
acceptance of the whole fascist ticket, … Just as on the voting 
papers of the mass party the elector is given names by the party 
machine to vote for en bloc, the basic ideological elements are 
coded on a few lists.
(Horkheimer and Adorno 1997, 200–201)
Thus, Horkheimer and Adorno assume a thinking that has 
lost the ability to judge by individual categories – all that 
remains is “blind subsumption” (ibid., 201) – and, there-
fore, even anti-Semitism as a distinct prejudice has come to 
an end: “But there are no more Anti-Semites” (ibid., 200). 
Especially with respect to the ticket thesis, Rensmann and 
Schulze Wessel wrote that Adorno and Horkheimer aban-
doned the possibility to understand specific historical 
mechanisms of prejudice, its specific functions and cultural 
embedment (Rensmann and Schulze Wessel 2003, 124). 
This may hold true if ticket thinking is conceptualized as a 
kind of mentality. But we will see that it is fertile to accen-
tuate the role of language: in a deteriorating language 
Horkheimer and Adorno saw the ability to make distinct 
judgments supplanted by merely stereotyped thinking:
In the world of mass series production, stereotypes replace indi-
vidual categories. Judgments are no longer based on a genuine 
synthesis but on blind subsumption. At an earlier stage of his-
tory judgments were based on hasty distinctions which gave 
impetus to the process, and in the meantime exchange, circu-
lation and legal precedents and convention have contributed 
their share. The process of judgment passed through the stage of 
weighing up the relative merits of individual cases, which gave 
the subject some measure of protection against brutal identifica-
tion with the predicate. In late industrial society, there is a 
regression to illogical judgment. When fascism replaced involved 
legal procedures by an accelerated form of judgment and retri-
bution, the up-to-date were economically prepared for this new 
development; they had learned to see things through the concep-
tual models, the termini technici, which remain as the iron ration 
when language disintegrates. The perceiver is no longer present 
in the process of perception. He no longer uses the active pass-
ivity of cognition in which the categorial components can be 
appropriately formed from a conventionally pre-shaped ‘given’, 
and the ‘given’ formed anew from these elements, so that justice 
is done to the perceived object. In the sphere of the social 
sciences, and in the world of individual experience, blind obser-
vation and empty concepts are grouped together rigidly and 
without mediation. In the age of three hundred keywords, the 
ability to make the effort required by judgment disappears, and 
the distinction between truth and falsehood is removed.
(Horkheimer and Adorno 1997, 201–202)
Thus, it is not primarily a certain character structure or 
mentality that is dealt with in the relevant fragments. 
Rather, in the fragment on the “Elements of Antisemitism” 
in the Dialectic of Enlightenment language is the mediator of 
the social and the individual and the medium of stereo-
types. Apparently, in this excerpt the notion of “judgment” 
is used in two senses: On the one hand, its literal sense, 
describing the difference between a “fair” trial in which the 
accused had the chance to be judged fairly in their own 
right in a process “of weighing up the relative merits of 
individual cases.” In a metaphorical sense, this idea of an 
appropriate judgment is transferred to perception (and vice 
versa): Just as fascism transformed fair process into a propa-
ganda trial where a pre-existing judgment was merely 
executed, the (potentially) fascist perceiver is no longer able 
to do justice to the perceived object. This is not because – in 
a first step – his or her ability to perceive somehow deterio-
rated, but because he or she “had learned to see things 
through the conceptual models, the termini technici, which 
remain as the iron ration when language disintegrates,” his 
or her perception deteriorates. That is to say, what we are 
able to perceive is due not to the “ghostly essence” of an 
antecedent inner state or structure, but to the language that 
we have at our disposal. The “up-to-date” are not prepared 
for fascism because they are fascists or have an antecedent 
fascist character structure which somehow attaches to lan-
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guage, but the other way around: because their language 
and, therefore, their thinking and feeling has already dis-
integrated to the “iron ration,” they are susceptible to a fas-
cist world view, to fascist ideology. Real living perception is 
an active-passive process: We perceive through our lan-
guage, but unless we are able to enact a process of “doing 
justice” to the perceived object, we fail to perceive it in a fair, 
emphatic sense. But how can we comprehend this process? 
Language, as it is conceptualized in the Dialectic of 
Enlightenment, is two-sided, as it is especially evident in the 
fragment on “The Concept of Enlightenment” (Hork-
heimer and Adorno 1997, 4ff.). By the means of language 
we are on the one hand able to fix an object and, thus, to 
build a distance between subject and object. If we are not 
able to name distinct objects, we are not able to make dif-
ferences, and everything remains chaotic. Using a language 
is an act of freedom, for it frees us from the chaotic and 
immediate proximity of objects. But on the other hand this 
is an act of alienation and dominion. Giving attributes to an 
object is at the same time (at least temporarily) abstraction 
from and abandonment of other qualities of this object. 
Simultaneously, language is a means that inherently offers 
the possibility to serve up justice for the object: By the 
means of language, we are not only able to fix the object, 
but also to “express the contradiction that something is 
itself and at one and the same time something other than 
itself, identical and not identical” (Horkheimer and Adorno 
1997, 15). That is, we are not necessarily able to express the 
non-identical, but we are able to express this contradiction 
as well as to reflect what we do with our words and concepts 
(Plug 2010, 57–58). And it is exactly in this sense that the 
abovementioned excerpt from the “Elements of Antisemit-
ism” can be understood: Stereotyping in its most advanced 
form is the complete lack of this kind of reflection and pass-
ive-active perception. The stereotyping subject is not able to 
use his/her language in that two-sided manner; s/he uses 
language to fix, but not in a way where the categorial com-
ponents “can be appropriately formed from a con-
ventionally pre-shaped ‘given’, and the ‘given’ formed anew 
from these elements, so that justice is done to the perceived 
object.” All that remains is the pre-shaped given. Thus, 
proper judgment vanishes and gives way to fascist judg-
ments, in perception as well as in the fascist trial. It was Zyg-
munt Bauman who pointedly recapitulated this notion of 
language for his diagnosis of modernity:
Ambivalence, the possibility of assigning an object or an event 
to more than one category, is a language-specific disorder: a 
failure of the naming (segregating) function that language is 
meant to perform. The main symptom of disorder is the acute 
discomfort we feel when we are unable to read the situation 
properly and to choose between alternative actions. It is because 
of the anxiety that accompanies it and the indecision which fol-
lows that we experience ambivalence as a disorder – and either 
blame language for lack of precision or ourselves for linguistic 
misuse. And yet ambivalence is not the product of the pathol-
ogy of language or speech. It is, rather, a normal aspect of lin-
guistic practice. It arises from one of the main functions of lan-
guage: that of naming and classifying.
(Bauman 1991, 1)
For Horkheimer and Adorno, this necessity of the ambiva-
lence of language at the same time comprises the possibil-
ity of a perception where subject and object are properly 
mediated – a just reflection that is able to likewise self-con-
sciously reflect on its own (necessary) stereotyping: “Only 
in that mediation by which the meaningless sensation 
brings a thought to the full productivity of which it is 
capable, while on the other hand the thought abandons 
itself without reservation to the predominant impression, 
is that pathological loneliness which characterizes the 
whole of nature overcome” (Horkheimer and Adorno 
1997, 189). Language itself inherently and necessarily 
involves both possibilities (and, for Horkheimer and 
Adorno as well as for Bauman, this is no failure of language 
but marks the possibility of freedom): an ultimately stereo-
typed language that solely fixes its object with rigid 
notions, and a living language of fair perception.5 Those 
possibilities are evidently not clearly separated or separable 
5 And in this respect, the Dialectic of Enlighten-
ment encompasses a dialectical philosophy of lan-
guage. Horkheimer and Adorno qualify the essence 
of language, of conceptual thinking and speaking, as 
permitting oppression as well as liberation. And 
insofar as each and every concept fixes its objects as 
well as potentially serving as the starting point for 
real living perception, it is the praxis of language 
that either allows the struggle for fair perception or 
makes it impossible. For Horkheimer and Adorno, it 
is National Socialism that is the point of cul-
mination of a reification of language, a point where 
the fixed and fixing parts of language prevail. 
National Socialist domination and reification of lan-
guage and the whole of society are the ultimate 
attempt to make everything conform absolutely.
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sides of language, one evil and one sound. For if we use 
concepts we do fix objects in the first place. It is rather a 
constant effort of critical reflection on the possibilities as 
well as on the futility of language (Plug 2010) that breaks 
the spell of stereotyping, and in this respect the concept of 
ticket thinking denotes instead an ideal-typical extreme of 
a continuum.
That implies on the one hand that the fight against stereo-
types can never come to an end: Stereotyping does not 
depend entirely on a certain social organization, but 
inheres in language. On the other hand, Horkheimer and 
Adorno conceptualized the process of enlightenment as a 
process of increasing freedom as well as a process of dis-
integration of reason in the medium of language and thus, 
in society, where “in the sphere of the social sciences, and 
in the world of individual experience, blind observation 
and empty concepts are grouped together rigidly and 
without mediation.” This disintegration marks the 
influence of an increasingly deteriorating society on lan-
guage, for language and social development are irrevocably 
intertwined. Enlightenment, which “has always aimed at 
liberating men from fear and establishing their sover-
eignty” (Horkheimer and Adorno 1997, 3) must fail, para-
doxically, if it does not reflect on its own impossibility. For 
if enlightenment is basically the effort of understanding 
and, thus, conceptualizing ever increasing parts of our 
social and natural world, then we could say, following Bau-
man, that it coincidentally and inwardly produces ambiva-
lence. This relationship constitutively affects all fragments 
of the Dialectic of Enlightenment, and in this respect, the 
fragment on “The Culture Industry” deals with the link 
between a general decline of language and the rise of fas-
cism. It is not so much a deliberate mass deception that the 
authors fear from the rise of culture industry, not in the 
sense that, for example, we are all manipulated in a well-
thought-out manner by advertising. Rather, the com-
modification of culture hastens not only cultural 
standardization, but likewise the standardization of lan-
guage and perception:
The blind and rapidly spreading repetition of words with 
special designations links advertising with the totalitarian 
watchtower. The layer of experience which created the words for 
their speakers has been removed; in this swift appropriation 
language acquires the coldness which until now it had only on 
billboards and in the advertisement columns of newspapers. 
Innumerable people use words and expressions which they have 
either ceased to understand or employ only because they trigger 
off conditioned reflexes; in this sense, words are trade-marks 
which are finally all the more firmly linked to the things they 
denote, the less their linguistic sense is grasped.
(Horkheimer and Adorno 1997, 165–66)
Culture, in short, “now impresses the same stamp on 
everything” (“Kultur heute schlägt alles mit Ähnlichkeit”) 
(ibid., 120). In other words, due to capitalist com-
modification not only of culture, but basically of all areas 
of life, it is not only objects that are subject to compara-
bility and reproducibility, but every kind of social relations 
as well as the subject itself. Ticket thinking, in this sense, 
does not denote a mental process, but a conceptual praxis of 
judging the world with precast categories. Thus, this kind 
of praxis would mean the end of particular perception and 
of the perception of the particular. It is this completely 
stereotyped language and therefore completely stereotyped 
mode of thinking that brings about an accomplished 
objectification of the subject, because the subject:
is no longer able to return to the object what he has received 
from it, he becomes poorer rather than richer. He loses the 
reflection in both directions: since he no longer reflects the 
object, he ceases to reflect upon himself, and loses the ability to 
differentiate. Instead of the voice of conscience, he hears other 
voices; instead of examining himself in order to decipher the 
protocol of its own lust for power, it attributes the “Protocols of 
the Elders of Zion” to others.
(Horkheimer and Adorno 1997, 189–90)
Far from being a mere critique of modern culture, the frag-
ment on culture industry debates the link between the 
essence of our language, its disintegration in a process of 
enlightenment that lacks critical self-reflection, and a sub-
ject that turns more and more into a potential fascist 
because s/he becomes increasingly unable to accomplish 
fair and emphatic judgments.
1.3. “Stereotyping” as Relational Concept
In this respect, the Authoritarian Personality can be read as 
an empirical litmus test for those theoretical consider-
ations. To read the Authoritarian Personality as a mere piece 
of individual psychology that may have the ambition to 
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include contextual factors, but fails in its implementation 
(for example Zick 1997), means to desist – at least partly – 
from its theoretical embedment. Of course, the Auth-
oritarian Personality is basically a psychoanalytically 
inspired empirical study that offers traces of the above-
mentioned theoretical fragments rather than systematically 
building upon them. Of course it can be read as a study on 
the authoritarian character or personality, but it likewise 
offers hints for a re-interpretation inspired by a critical 
philosophy of language:
This [manipulative] syndrome, potentially the most dangerous 
one, is defined by stereotypy as an extreme: rigid notions 
become ends rather than means, and the whole world is divided 
into empty, schematic, administrative fields. There is an almost 
complete lack of object cathexis and of emotional ties. … How-
ever, the break between internal and external world, in this case, 
does not result in anything like ordinary “introversion,” but 
rather the contrary: a kind of compulsive overrealism which 
treats everything and everyone as an object to be handled, 
manipulated, seized by the subject’s own theoretical and prac-
tical patterns. … The ingoup-outgroup relationship becomes 
the principle according to which the whole world is abstractly 
organized.
(Adorno et al. 1950, 767–68)
It is obvious that Adorno et al. conceptualize this “poten-
tially most dangerous” syndrome in line with the reflec-
tions in the Dialectic of Enlightenment. They do not 
describe a character structure that shows itself in language 
(even if, once again, this excerpt can be read as such a 
description). But, clearly, the stereotyping itself happens in 
language, in “rigid notions” and “empty, schematic fields.” 
This empty language works in two directions: One direc-
tion is what can be described as perception of the outside 
world. Because we perceive and interpret the outside world 
by the means of language, rigid notions are not able to 
trigger the perception of anything new or ambivalent. 
Stereotyping, thus, is to identify something or someone 
with precast and rigid concepts. The other direction is 
inward: Exactly because the subject is not able to really per-
ceive, s/he “becomes poorer rather than richer. S/he loses 
the reflection in both directions: since he no longer reflects 
the object, he ceases to reflect upon himself, and loses the 
ability to differentiate” (Horkheimer and Adorno 1997, 
189) – s/he lacks the “emotional ties” and therefore the 
ability to feel empathy.
But this most “advanced” form of stereotyping does not 
imply a lack of specificity in the analysis of stereotyping. 
That would only be true if we conceptualize ticket thinking 
as a mentality or an inner state of mind; for as such it 
would be invisible and, thus, basically inexplicable. In 
today’s research on prejudice, it is common ground that 
prejudices against different out-groups are very likely not to 
occur separately (for example, a person is prejudiced against 
Turkish immigrants, but not against any other groups), but 
are embedded in a syndrome of somehow interrelated 
prejudices: If a person is prejudiced against one out-group, 
s/he is most likely to be prejudiced against other out-groups 
as well. Recently, Zick and colleagues reconfirmed this 
hypothesis on a European level (Zick, Küpper, and Höver-
mann 2011). Their argument is that different prejudices 
share a common core, which they (following Heitmeyer 
2002) identify as “an ideology of unequal status” (Zick, 
Küpper, and Hövermann 2011, 38). With regard to the 
Authoritarian Personality, we can now add a decisive 
hypothesis to the research on the syndrome character of 
prejudice: If prejudice is a phenomenon that is not anteced-
ent to language, but inheres and happens within language, 
then its syndrome character must be identifiable in lan-
guage as well. Thus, if we figure our concept of “stereotyp-
ing” as a linguistic phenomenon, the relationship between 
stereotyping, ticket thinking, and the syndrome character of 
prejudice can be grasped coherently: stereotyping is a 
matter of language. It happens when the fixed elements of 
language prevail over its possibility to enable – in an act of 
active-passive reflection – the subject to open up different 
(ambivalent, non-identical) facets of the object, that is, to 
perceive in an emphatic and just sense and, thus, to do jus-
tice to the object. This function of fair judgment comes to 
an end in ticket thinking, which is a metaphor used to illus-
trate an absolutely stereotyped, therefore reified and reify-
ing language. The syndrome character of prejudice is the 
conceptual and empirical result of these considerations, for 
if the world is perceived in “empty, schematic, adminis-
trative fields,” the particular necessarily vanishes for the 
benefit of mere stereotypy. The finding that a person “who 
is hostile toward one minority group is very likely to be 
hostile against a wide variety of others” (Adorno et al. 1950, 
9) follows from that, because if stereotyping is the general 
mode of perception there is no room for individual judg-
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ments. People are not judged individually, but ordered, for 
example according to antecedent ingroup-/outgroup dif-
ferentiations. Nonetheless, ticket thinking is specific, for a 
general tendency in thinking and speaking has to appear in 
particular phenomena; otherwise we would not be able to 
speak of a general tendency. For Adorno, Horkheimer and 
the authors of the Authoritarian Personality, ticket thinking 
is both: It is a general social phenomenon that nonetheless 
shows up in specific manners, for example the stereotypical 
view of “the Jews” is different from that of “the Irish,” but 
the overall mechanism is that of rigid notions.
I began by outlining basic assumptions of discursive psy-
chology. Instead of searching for the “ghostly essences” of 
mental or somehow “inner” states, it was argued, attention 
has to switch to discourse, to everyday language and the 
specific context in which it is situated. I showed that the 
fragments of the Dialectic of Enlightenment are centered on 
a concept of language that allows us to understand the dia-
lectic of enlightenment as a history of an increasing social 
disintegration that accompanies and is interdependent with 
a decline of language. Ticket thinking can be understood as 
the triumph of a blind enlightenment that left nothing but 
stereotyped language: “empty schematic fields” and, there-
fore, “blind observation.” This process is associated with an 
inner exhaustion of the individual, for its inner richness or 
poorness, its ability for recognition (Honneth 1996) and 
empathy are essentially linked to the way it may or may not 
perceive the social world. However, if stereotyping is not 
bound to a specific form of social organization, but inheres 
in language, it is not (only) the fight against all reifying and 
totalitarian tendencies that protects against it, but constant 
critical self-reflection: “We are wholly convinced – and 
therein lies our petition principii – that social freedom is 
inseparable from enlightened thought” (Horkheimer and 
Adorno 1997, introduction, xiii). In this respect, the 
manipulative syndrome, as depicted in the Authoritarian 
Personality, is the opposite of enlightened thought: It is 
conditioned by compulsive overrealism which “treats 
everything and everyone as an object to be handled, 
manipulated, and seized by the subject’s own theoretical 
and practical patterns” (Adorno et al. 1950, 767).
So far, two conceptions of stereotyping have been dis-
cussed: The idea of a somehow “inner” state or mentality 
that attaches to language and, likewise, the idea that stereo-
typing could be identified in single notions or words. For if 
stereotyping is a particular linguistic mode of relating to 
the world, it becomes rather problematic to speak of a 
stereotype. Stereotyping denotes a relation to the world 
where we “do not first see, and then define, [but where] we 
define first and then see” (Lippmann 1949, 81) what we 
already defined. That is, if we do not conceptualize stereo-
typing as a “mental state of readiness” (Allport), but as the 
linguistic modality in which a person relates to someone or 
something, the focus of research switches from “inner” 
states to language. Thus if stereotyping denotes a process 
where X relates to Y in a stereotyped mode, stereotyping has 
no existence beyond language, but happens in and by lan-
guage. It seems to be a particularity of the concept of 
stereotyping that it strongly refers to discourse. For whether 
someone relates stereotypically to persons, things, or 
groups can only be decided on the basis of his or her 
speech, the mode or the way in which s/he speaks. Inasmuch 
as this concept of stereotyping refers to discourse, critical 
theory and the Authoritarian Personality seem to be sys-
tematically adaptable to discursive and rhetorical psychol-
ogy, though it is not the aim of this paper to accomplish 
that task.
In a second step, I will now illustrate this relational concept 
of stereotyping and the syndrome character of prejudice 
using a concrete example, the manifesto of the Norwegian 
mass murderer Anders Behring Breivik.
2. Ticket Thinking in Breivik’s Manifesto
Studying Anders Breivik’s Manifesto is a weird task. Not 
only are there hundreds of pages of quotes, mostly from 
Islamophobic and conspiracist weblogs.6 One way of doing 
research on the text would certainly be to take definitions 
6 Pantucci (2011) draws on the manifesto to dis-
cuss lone wolf terrorism. Just (2011) examined what 
he called Breivik’s parasitic use of other texts, and 
Sandberg (2013) analyzed the manifesto in terms of 
narrative criminology.
IJCV : Vol. 7 (1) 2013, pp. 150 – 163
Bjoern Milbradt: Stereotyping, Prejudice, and Breivik’s Manifesto 159
of several prejudices and to apply, for example, a qualitative 
content analysis method to it. But besides a compilation of 
the prejudices the text contains, what would be the result? I 
already argued that ticket thinking is conceptualized in the 
Dialectic of Enlightenment as extreme stereotyping in the 
sense that “rigid notions become means rather than ends”; 
ticket thinking itself is primarily a matter of language and 
only subsequently a matter of psyche. Therefore, we are not 
so much concerned with a set of completely different 
stereotypes, but with a common and very general form of 
speaking, a syndrome that shows itself in specific and vary-
ing stereotyped content.
Whilst a lot of the manifesto consists of quotations, of all 
kinds of references to other authors and bloggers, at least 
the interview (that Breivik apparently did with himself) 
seems to stem solely from his authorship. The interview 
covers not only his attitudes towards immigration, Euro-
pean politics, and so forth, but also contains episodes 
about his childhood, friends, private life, etc. In applying a 
distinction between the general phenomenon of ticket 
thinking and its content, I will argue that the decisive fea-
ture of the manifesto is not the amount or intensity of 
stereotypes and prejudice that it holds, but the mode in 
which they are presented. I will use Breivik’s manifesto 
“2083 – A European Declaration of Independence,” which 
he published online under the name of Andrew Berwick 
(Berwick 2011), and which is available on the Washington 
Post website. I will take a closer look at three aspects of the 
interview: Breivik’s position towards other movements, 
towards certain social groups, and towards the Holocaust.
2.1. Other Movements in the Self-Interview
Breivik places special emphasis on National Socialism, 
anticipating that following the attacks the media would 
consider him a Nazi terrorist. For him National Socialism 
is a “dead ideology” because:
The ideology was defeated in WW2 but many right wing indi-
viduals still refuse to let it go. By doing so they are effectively 
undermining CURRENT concerns and needs of our time. 
There are currently so many defensive mechanisms in place in 
Western European societies against National Socialism that any 
attempt to resurrect the ideology will be counter-productive 
(Berwick 2011, 1367).
Thus, Breivik draws a line between himself and supporters 
of National Socialism not because of their inhuman ideo-
logy, because the genocide of six million European Jews, 
but because to him National Socialism is an old fashioned 
ideology that activates defense mechanisms in society and 
is therefore counter-productive in the current struggle. 
Instead, the “cultural conservative movement” he claims to 
be a member of is designed “to resist these defensive mech-
anisms or ‘baits’ if you will” (ibid.). His approach to 
Nazism is instrumental: because it is a taboo, it is useless in 
today’s struggle and an obstacle to the victory of cultural 
conservatism.
One of the other groups he discusses is Odinists. On the 
one hand, he argues, he is extremely proud of his “Odinist 
heritage” “as it is an essential aspect of my culture and my 
identity” (ibid., 1360). But at the same time he rejects the 
idea that Odinism and Odinist symbols can serve to unite 
Europe to defeat cultural Marxism and Muslim immi-
gration:
There are pragmatical considerations Odinists have to evaluate 
as well. Do they really believe the symbolism of Mjollnir 
(Thors [sic] hammer) has the potential to unite the Nordic 
peoples against the forces we are facing? Do they really believe 
Odinistic symbolism would be more suitable compared to the 
uniting force of Christendom’s symbolism and that of the 
cross? Anyone with half a brain will know that only the sym-
bolism of the cross (which is a part of all the Nordic flags btw 
with the exception of Germany) has the potential to unite us 
for this cause.
(ibid., 1360–61)
The form of the argumentation is the same as on Nazism. 
Odinism is discussed not in terms of its content, but 
according to considerations of instrumental reason: Is Odi-
nism an ideology that may serve to unite “us” against 
“our” enemies?
2.2. Breivik’s Position Towards Other (Minority) Groups
In fact, Breivik vehemently tries to avoid the impression 
that he is (at least in an essentialist sense) a racist. He does 
not tire of asserting that other cultural minorities have the 
right to live in Europe (as far as they “assimilate”) and 
that cooperation with other (non-Muslim) countries is 
desirable:
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support the continued consolidation of non-Muslim Europe 
and an unconditional support to all Christian countries and 
societies (Israel included), in addition to continuing our good 
relationships with all Hindu and Buddhist countries. As such, I 
don’t support the deportation of non-Muslims from Europe as 
long as they are fully assimilated (I’m a supporter of many of 
the Japanese/Taiwan/South Korean policies/principles).
(ibid., 1384)
The relation to other cultures remains fixed: If minorities 
inside Europe fully assimilate (and therefore vanish), they 
may be welcome, but not in too large numbers. If they do 
not, they will be deported. The whole set of possible cross-
cultural relationships is subordinated to one single issue: 
do these cultures “fit” to our culture? If they do not, they 
are enemies or, at least, must be kept out of Europe. Islam 
is and will forever be the main enemy, because it is a cul-
ture fundamentally opposed to the European, as Breivik 
argues at length in large parts of the manifesto: “The 
Islamic world on the other hand should be completely iso-
lated and Islam reclassified and banned as a fascist/
imperialistic and genocidal political ideology” (ibid., 1384)
A second group he deals with is women. Several times in 
the text he describes himself as a pragmatic and rational 
individual: “I am first and foremost a man of logic.” (ibid., 
1404). Nonetheless, even if he endorses a society that is 
built upon those principles, there is one exception: women. 
For if women fully adopt rationality and logic, a problem 
may emerge: “I support the propagation of collective 
rational thought but not necessarily on a personal level. 
Because, if a woman was purely rational, she would choose 
to not have babies at all, and instead live her life in a purely 
egotistical manner.” (ibid., 1386). That is, men like him 
may adopt rationality and the collective. But in order to 
secure the reproduction of the (European) society, women 
must be exempted. Once again, individuals are sub-
ordinated to groups and groups are subordinated to their 
function for a “cultural conservative” Europe.
2.3. The Holocaust in the Self-Interview
Even if Breivik might not be a Holocaust denier, he cer-
tainly relativizes it. The European “multiculturalist elite,” 
he writes, uses the “Jewish Holocaust” to relativize “other 
Holocausts” like, in particular, the “Islamic Holocausts” of 
Christians and Hindus (ibid., 1366). According to his 
account, Islam has “slaughtered 300 million people since 
its creation” (ibid., 1366), and appears as a much worse 
ideology than Nazism. By completely abstracting from the 
Nazism ideology, the circumstances and particularities of 
the genocide of the European Jews, he manages to make 
the Holocaust appear a minor incident in world history. 
But the decisive argument is, once again: How can we deal 
with the Holocaust so that it may serve today’s struggle 
against Islam and “multiculturalism”?
The “holocaust religion” has grown into a destructive anti-
European monster, which prevents nationalistic doctrines 
from emerging. And without nationalistic doctrines, Europe 
will wither and die, which we are seeing today. It’s quite 
ironic that Even Israel would appear to have become a vic-
tim of it. Needless to say, while I am a strong supporter of 
Israel and of all patriotic Jews I acknowledge that the anti-
European holocaust religion must be deconstructed, and 
instead replaced with an anti-Islamic version. (ibid., 1366)
Thus, history must be re-written: In order to encourage 
European youth and strengthen their self-awareness, the 
Holocaust has to be put in its “right” (and therefore 
minor) place. Like everything, the interpretation of the 
Holocaust is not about truth, but about instrumentality. Of 
course the Germans wrong were to kill the Jews. But the 
main issue now must be to “deconstruct” this “Holocaust 
religion” in order to back European nationalism.
3. Stereotyping in Breivik’s Manifesto and the Syndrome Character of 
Prejudice
Regarding those thoughts of Anders Breivik, it is clearly not 
the amount of different and separate prejudices towards 
other outgroups that is their decisive feature, but the 
stereotypical interconnection of different social groups and 
sectors like politics, minorities, and (potential) allies. Every 
single group, every single world view is subordinated and 
judged according to one single principle: the instrumental 
practicability of installing a culturally “pure” Europe rid of 
competing world views (in particular: “cultural Marxism”) 
and cleansed of all traces of Islam. The overall goal of all 
ideological fragments developed in the manifesto is homo-
geneity at all points. That is, it is not a particular logic that 
each prejudice follows, for example an anti-feminist, anti-
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Semitic, anti-multicultural, or anti-Islamic. Conversely, 
every single issue is ordered according to the “pre-shaped 
given,” and that is Breivik’s fixed worldview. In his ideo-
logy, anti-feminism has no discrete logic, but conveys the 
overall logic of this single idea that is applied to each and 
everything: “It seems plain that what one has to deal with 
here is not a single specific attitude but a system that has 
content, scope, and structure” (Adorno et al. 1950, 42), and 
both “ingroups and outgroups are thought of in the same 
general terms; the same evaluative criteria are applied to 
groups generally, and a given characteristic, such as clan-
nishness or power, is good or bad depending on what 
group has it” (ibid., 44) In this respect the authors of the 
Authoritarian Personality – by their concepts of stereotyp-
ing and the syndrome character of prejudice – described a 
way of stereotypically relating to the world, a linguistic 
mode of relation. That also implies that figuring out the 
content of this mode is the task of empirical social research; 
for if there is no stereotype in the sense of an inner entity 
or mental structure, but “stereotyping” is a metaphorical 
way of describing a linguistic relation, the content of this 
relation may vary. In Breivik’s worldview, everything is 
subordinated to his concept of a cultural “pure” Europe, 
and applying this ticket, this pre-shaped concept of purity, 
to everyone and everything is his particular stereotyped 
way of relating to the world. Thus, the particular syndrome 
character of Breivik is this particular linguistic mode of 
relation – the syndrome character of prejudice may be an 
ideology of unequal status (Zick, Küpper and Hövermann 
2011), but that is a particular content that may vary. And 
what is more, the syndrome character is not limited to 
prejudices against outgroups. For if the concept denotes a 
stereotypical relation to the world, it may by definition 
affect not only outgroups, but government, religion, family 
issues, and so forth.7 The special contribution of Hork-
heimer, Adorno, and colleagues therefore is to identify a 
social process that enforces this deterioration of language – 
which would mean, in the sense discussed in the present 
paper, a general tendency of stereotypically relating to the 
world, to outgroups, politics, and so forth.
Finally, I want to outline at least three methodological con-
sequences that the precedent thoughts may imply for 
research on stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination:
a) If stereotyping does not happen inside and hidden, but 
in language, researching stereotypes does not mean 
searching for traces of an unobservable mentality or 
cognitive structure. What prevails in Breivik’s lan-
guage is “blind subsumption” and the “iron ration” 
that remains “when language disintegrates” (Hork-
heimer and Adorno 1997, 201–202). Breivik is not 
able to see the individual because he pre-judges every-
thing with fixed notions. And likewise, because by this 
he is not able to perceive anything new, anything indi-
vidual, the process of perception as a whole comes to 
an end: “He no longer uses the active passivity of cog-
nition in which the categorial components can be 
appropriately formed from a conventionally pre-
shaped ‘given’, and the ‘given’ formed anew from 
these elements, so that justice is done to the perceived 
object” (Horkheimer and Adorno 1997, l.c.). That is, 
ticket thinking leaves its bearer as empty as his/her 
perception of the world. This, needless to say, does 
not argue against a (social) psychology of stereotyp-
ing, but stresses the role of language as both mediator 
and medium of psychological traits. Analogously to 
the example given at the beginning, concerning how 
we know that we hope, one could explain how we 
know that someone has a stereotyped world view. We 
would for instance say that s/he relates in the same 
way to everyone, that s/he – in behavior as well as 
speech “impresses the same stamp” on everything and 
everyone. But figuring out what exactly the stamp is 
remains a task of critical social research. For the 
Anders Breivik’s Manifesto I showed that it may be an 
idea of homogeneity, but likewise we could conceive 
of an idea of productivity to which the whole society 
and its members are subsumed, or of obedience/dis-
obedience to authority as the overall logic of a syn-
drome.
7 It seems reasonable to assume that this may also 
be why Adorno and colleagues never offered a defi-
nition of authoritarianism, but rather thought of it 
as a conglomerate of different facets (Adorno et al. 
1950, 255ff.) that may vary in scope and content 
from respondent to respondent.
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b) If there is no antecedent psychology that expresses itself 
in language, but language forms and mediates individ-
ual psychology (and therefore turns it into a social psy-
chology in the first place), then the study of a syndrome 
character of prejudice is primarily a study of language. 
The syndrome character of prejudice is not identical 
with devaluing a couple of outgroups. Rather, it is a sec-
ond level that shows in particular stereotypical speech 
acts, but does not completely coincide. For the case of 
Breivik’s manifesto, I have shown that that this second 
level is a political idea of homogeneity that is stereo-
typically applied and constitutes the general coherence 
of the particular syndrome, or to put it in another way: 
it is a specific form of thinking and speaking that shows 
itself in specific stereotyped content. Thus, a qualitative 
and mixed method research on stereotyping has to do 
research on stereotypes in their particular contexts, for 
example in texts or everyday language.
c) Our conception of what stereotypes really are influences 
the way we try to fight them. If the problem is not a pre-
judgment that can be easily corrected by, for example, 
telling prejudiced people that “we are all equal” and 
they do not have to be afraid of outgroups, or that the 
Jewish religion is nothing to bother about by showing 
them a synagogue, then education on stereotyping has 
to change. Adorno clearly saw that and, in his haunting 
text on “Education after Auschwitz” (2005, 28), outlined 
an educational program that sets out first and foremost 
to instill reflection the self and the social mechanisms 
he identified as partly responsible for the emergence of 
the manipulative type:
For this disastrous state of conscious and unconscious thought 
includes the erroneous idea that one’s own particular way of 
being – that one is just so and not otherwise – is nature, an 
unalterable given, and not a historical evolution. I mentioned 
the concept of reified consciousness. Above all, this is a con-
sciousness blinded to all historical past, all insight into one’s 
own conditionedness, and posits as absolute what exists contin-
gently. If this coercive mechanism were once ruptured, then, I 
think, something would indeed be gained.
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